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Abstract: Based on the available information (eg.multiple functional faults or sensor
errors give rise to similar alarm patterns or outcomes), some states in the behaviour
of a network can not be distinguished from one another. So, the computer network’s
fault tree reliability analysis frequently relies on imprecise or vague input data. The
paper will use a Dempster-Shafer Theory to accommodate this vagueness and it will
show how imprecision can give rise to false-negative, and false-positive inferences;
there will be assigned upper and lower bounds for the probability on elements of
the state space. After illustrating the computational simplicity of incorporating the
Dempster-Shafer Theory probability assignments, we will apply them for analyzing
the reliability of the network of our department.
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1 Introduction
The probabilities are no longer appropriate to represent vagueness in risk and reliability analyses;
fuzzy set theory was proposed instead to quantify vagueness in this area [1]. Development in DST have
shown how probability can be adapted to incomplete or vague information, especially information that
is based on human judgment or human-machine interaction.
False positives and false-negatives are often the end products of vagueness or imprecision. They can
arise from imprecision due to noise in monitored data, sensor device failure, or from the ambiguity about
the logic rules in the fault tree.
So, when the researcher has only imprecise information, he must appeal to fuzzy-set theory tech-
niques, either the common laws or logic his appreciation for the logic relations in fault trees. Fuzzy data
can be incorporated through Dempster Shafer Theory (DST) [2] [3] [4] [5] in conventional fault-tree
analysis yield meaningful results.
2 Dempster-Shafer Theory mass assignments
DST generalizes classical probability theory by assigning upper und lower bounds for probabilities,
as opposed to point values, to both the elements and the subsets of the state space. For a given state space,
W , mass (probability) is assigned over the set of all possible subsets of W . Because each element of W
is also a subset of W (comprising 1 element) any classical probability assignment can be represented in
DST. Just as the probabilities of a distribution sum to 1, so do the masses of a DST-distribution.
Copyright c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The standard risk analysis possibility set considered is W={True, False}. Therefore, the power set,
2W = {F , T, F, (T, F)} contains an element (T,F) that represents an observation that could be either true
or false, but not both.
The components of faults trees - the initiating events, consequences, and rules - are typically given
fail or not fail possibilities. In some engineering applications, observation of particular initiating events
is imprecise, so an analyst cannot tell whether a given event occurred. By using DST method of assigning
probability to the (T,F) event, fault tree analysts can quantitatively depict the imprecision [7].
Based on the fact that [sum of all masses] = 1 and based on the fact that in DST m(F) = 0, after DST
renormalization of the F , the state space become: T, F, (T, F), and:
m (T) + m (F) + m (T,F) = 1
Ordinary fault trees are systems of Boolean equations with components joined by Boolean AND &
OR gates. The Boolean AND gate for the members of the effective state space is summarized in Figure
1 [7], and the Boolean OR gate is given in Figure 2.
Figure 1: Boolean Truth Table for the AND gate
^ T F (T,F)
T T F (T,F)
F F F F
(T,F) (T,F) F (T,F)
Figure 2: Boolean Truth Table for the OR gate
_ T F (T,F)
T T T T
F T F (T,F)
(T,F) T (T,F) (T,F)
The mass for each entry in the table is obtained by multiply-ing the masses of the edge entries and
adding all masses of like entries. For example:
Let a1;a2;a3 numbers denoting ma over the possibilities T;F;(T;F) where a1+a2+a3=1
Let b1;b2;b3 numbers denoting mb over the possibilities T;F;(T;F) where b1+b2+b3=1
For the Boolean OR gate from table 2 we have:
mfA_Bg= (a1b1+a1b2+a1b3+a2b1+a3b1;a2b2;a2b3+a3b2+a3b3) (1)
= (a1+a2b1+a3b1;a2b2;a2b3+a3b2+a3b3)
Thus, for (A_B) the T element has mass assignment (a1+ a2b1+ a3b1), the F element has mass
assignment a2b2, the (T,F) element has mass assignment (a2b3+a3b2+a3b3).
Similarly, for the Boolean gate from Figure 1, we have:
mA^B= (a1b1;a1b2+a2b1+a2b2+a2b3+a3b2;a1b3+a3b1+a3b3) (2)
= (a1b1;a1b2+a2+a3b2;a1b3+a3b1+a3b3)
3 Fault Tree illustration
We will apply the above techniques for the fault tree that corresponds to the network monitoring
system of our department. Our network uses 3 routers and it accesses the Internet through the university
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router (Figure 3). It comprises the following elements:
R1 “HN” Router R1’s fault represent the E1 event
R2 “Cazarma” Router R2’s fault represent the E2 event
R3 “CNLAB” Router R3’s fault represent the E3 event
R4 “Univ.Oradea” Router R4’s fault represent the E4 event
S1 Files Server S1’s fault represent the E5 event
S2 FTP Server S2’s fault represent theE6 event
S3 Database Server S3’s fault represent the E7 event
S4 Domain Server S4’s fault represent the E8 event
The network’s fault tree representation is shown in Figure 4.
Figure 3: Computer Science Network
The top event is labelled T on the tree represented in Figure 4. The initiating events Ei (i=1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
6, 7, 8) lead to intermediate results (levels), Ij (j=1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6). The fault tree comprises the following
Boolean equations:
T = I1_ I6 (3)
I1= E3_E4 (4)
I6= I4_ I5 (5)
I4= I2_ I3 (6)
I2= E5_E6 (7)
I3= E7_E8 (8)
I5= E1_E2 (9)
The equal signs in equations (3)  (9) mean that the logical implications works in both directions.
To assess the risk of the top event, masses can be assigned to the initiating events Ei, and then propagated
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up the tree based on relations (1) and (2). The main problem is the determining of the probabilities of
basic initiating events (how are they assigned or determined).
Figure 4: The Fault Tree
Each of (3)  (9) can be interpreted as an "if : : : then : : : " rule of the fault tree and considered as
much part of the fault tree as the initiating events. So, let Ri be a parameter about the failure rates of rule
i = 3, : : : , 9, where the i-th corresponds to equations i [6]. When joined to our existing fault tree, the
Ri depict a further constraint on the fault tree, through which the initiating events must pass before an
intermediate level is reached. The Ri can be interpreted in several ways. For example, to model "silent
alarms" when the true state of a system is abnormal, the Ri could represent incidents in which the alarms
are not working properly. If a rule were incorporated in the design of the fault tree such that the rule were
true in only 9 out of 10 trials, then coupling Ri with a Boolean AND gate to the existing tree could filter
the number of sure fire observations from the rule to 9/10..
Joining the Ri to the fault tree through an AND gate is useful in modelling false negatives. When
the Ri are joined to the fault tree by AND gates and some sensors fail during abnormal conditions, the
anticipated consequence might not occur on the fault tree because it has been falsely stopped by the rule
parameter.
We will focus only on false-negatives, and thus, the Ri are joined to the existing fault tree through
some Boolean AND gates. The new fault tree graphically represents the seven equations:
T = (I1_ I6)^R3 (10)
I1= (E3_E4)^R4 (11)
I6= (I4_ I5)^R5 (12)
I4= (I2_ I3)^R6 (13)
I2= (E5_E6)^R7 (14)
I3= (E7_E8)^R8 (15)
562 D. E. Popescu, M. Lonea, D. Zmaranda, C. Vancea, C. Tiurbe
I5= (E1_E2)^R9 (16)
We consider 3 adjustable assignments of mass for the initiating events and rules variables on the fault
tree; these are given in Table 1.
Table 1: Mass Assignment
cwev Case I Case II Case III
E1 (0.9, 0.1, 0) (0.8, 0, 0.2) (0.8, 0, 0.2)
E2 (0.9, 0.1, 0) (0.8, 0, 0.2) (0.8, 0, 0.2)
E3 (0.9, 0.1, 0) (0.8, 0, 0.2) (0.8, 0, 0.2)
E4 (0.9, 0.1, 0) (0.8, 0, 0.2) (0.8, 0, 0.2)
E5 (0.8, 0.2, 0) (0.9, 0, 0.1) (0.9, 0, 0.1)
E6 (0.8, 0.2, 0) (0.7, 0, 0.3) (0.9, 0, 0.1)
E7 (0.8, 0.2, 0) (0.9, 0, 0.1) (0.9, 0, 0.1)
E8 (0.8, 0.2, 0) (0.9, 0, 0.1) (0.9, 0, 0.1)
R9 (0.8, 0, 0.2) (0.8, 0, 0.2) (0.9, 0.1, 0)
R8 (0.7, 0, 0.3) (0.9, 0, 0.1) (0.8, 0.2, 0)
R7 (0.9, 0, 0.1) (0.9, 0, 0.1) (0.8, 0.2, 0)
R6 (0.9, 0, 0.1) (0.9, 0, 0.1) (0.8, 0.2, 0)
R5 (0.9, 0, 0.1) (0.7, 0, 0.3) (0.7, 0.3, 0)
R4 (0.8, 0, 0.2) (0.8, 0, 0.2) (0.8, 0.2, 0)
1. The initiating events have the usual probability p assigned to true and the remaining (1-p) is as-
signed to false. The rule variables have the reliability factor assigned to true and the remaining
non-true mass assigned to Y (T,F). The rule variables correspond to information that each of the
rule has held, eg, in 8 out of 10 trials. In the 2 remaining trials, there are not sufficient informations
to validate or invalidate the rule.
2. The reliability factor is assigned to true and the remaining non-true mass on both the rule param-
eters and the initiating events is assigned to the Y (T,F) term. There are no sufficient information
to conclude whether the event or rule failed. The remaining mass is assigned to Y (T,F) term - it is
better than assigning the remaining mass to True or False.
3. The evidence is precise on the rule validations but imprecise on the initiating events. There is
the situation of a good appreciation of the logic structure of the engineering system but there are
problems with the devices. The mass assignments can be obtained from relations (1) and (2)
together with the values from Figure 1 For our case study we made our calculation in Microsoft
Excel. Our first calculation was made based on relations (3) - (9) and the results are given in Figure
5, and then we made the calculus based on relations (10) - (16) and the results are given in Figure
6.
By analyzing the results from Figure 5 and Figure 6 we conclude that it is obvious more realistic to
compute the probability of the T event with DST than without it.
On the other hand, the results of the three cases considered by us are given in Figure 7, Figure 8 and
Figure 9.
In Case I (Figure 7) the mass is distributed on all 3 elements. The top event occurs with probability
0,6213 with the remaining non-true mass on the Y (T,F) and on the false elements.
In Case II (Figure 8) the remaining non-true mass on the intermediate and final events of the fault
tree is assigned to the false element of the consequences. This is due to the allocation of zero mass to the
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Figure 5: Calculus without imprecision on rules
Figure 6: Calculus with imprecision on rules
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false elements of the initiating events and rules. The mass of the true element of T is 0,6218, with the
remaining 0,3782 mass distributed to the uncommitted term.
The Case III (Figure 9) reflects the most realistic case with fuzzy input data on the initiating events
but clear knowledge of the logic rules. The resulting probability assignments from Figure 9 reflect the
distribution of all 3 elements.
Cases I, II and III offer interesting comparisons. In case I we have only vague information on the
accuracy of the rules, while in case III we have vague observations of the initiating events. The nu-
merical estimates for the true elements are the same in both cases because both assume the same mass
assignments for the true elements of the initiating events and rule parameters. Apparently, the effects of
the uncertainly on the rules do not begin to offset the certainly on the initiating events until the mass is
propagated up through the majority of the Boolean gates.
Figure 7: Mass Assignment for Case I
Figure 8: Mass Assignment for Case II
4 Conclusions
This paper illustrate the advantages of using DST methodology (acting on binary state space with
either true or false elements) for representing vagueness and imprecision in reliability analysis of net-
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Figure 9: Mass Assignment for Case III
works. We used DST probability assignments for the component of fault trees and a separate parameter
on each Boolean rule to show how a pattern of false-negative can be observed.
So, DST offers a more accurate representation of knowledge.
Therefore, when there is incomplete knowledge or a limited database upon which to make proba-
bility assignments, DST offers a clear advantage over binary (true, false) assignments in representing
vagueness.
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